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President Donald Trump offered an upbeat assessment of the war with Iran on Wednesday. He claimed that the nation is “on track to complete all of America’s military objectives shortly.” Trump referenced a two- to three-week timeline in this regard. He also suggested that Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz energy chokepoint would end after the war concluded, regardless of U.S. military action.
Still, Trump’s recent rhetoric and his reference on Wednesday to the economy and voter concerns over rising gas prices clarified a more fundamental point. Namely, Trump wants to end the war as soon as possible, emphasized by his claim that “regime change” was never an objective of this war and that the Iranian regime had already changed under U.S. and Israeli force of arms. This does not reflect what Trump said before the war or the reality on the ground. It does, however, signal that Trump wants Americans to know this war will be over sooner rather than later. Trump’s problem?
He just doesn’t know how to end the war while also credibly claiming it was successful.
This tension puts Trump at odds with the United States’s Middle Eastern allies. Trump’s war partner, Israel, and the Sunni Arab monarchies want the U.S. to continue fighting until the Iranian regime falls. Either that, or Iran agrees to verifiable restrictions on its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and its support for regional proxies such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.
The problem, as some predicted, is that Iran is holding up under the very heavy weight of U.S. and Israeli air power. Ending this regime would very likely require months of continued air strikes and escalating ground force actions. Even then, Iran might end up as a bloody failed state. This would be in Israel’s interest but a disaster for U.S. interests.
Trump appears to recognize this difficult situation. What’s less clear is whether he recognizes that any near-term peace deal will require limited rather than expansive conditions.
Iran, as it now stands, is not just going to give up on funding its proxies. These are the joined shields and swords of its holy Islamic revolutionary project. To abandon them would be to surrender the regime’s raison d’être. At least to the degree that it can threaten Israel and the Sunni monarchies in a minimal fashion, the same is true of Iran’s drone and ballistic missile programs. If Trump wants Iran so neutered, he’ll have to send U.S. ground forces into combat.
Again, there are no easy options. The U.S. would likely lose dozens of Marines in seizing Iran’s key energy terminal at Kharg Island, for example. But ground action on Kharg would also likely require ground operations on the southern Iranian mainland bordering the Strait of Hormuz. These forces would be needed to help open the Strait of Hormuz and provide air defense umbrellas for forces on Kharg.
Would Iran then buckle into compliance?
It’s unlikely. Partly fueled by Trump’s own rhetoric, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps cadre now in charge of Iran perceives that Trump is desperate for a deal. The Guard clearly believes it can outlast Trump’s resolve. U.S. ground forces could seize Kharg Island and better disrupt Iran’s shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz. But Iran would then rain drones and missiles down upon these forces (it bears noting that the U.S. military has struggled to address Iranian drone threats) alongside suicide bomb and other attacks. While the regime would fear the economic losses associated with Kharg’s capture, it has surely been heartened by the absence of a popular uprising or security force defections. And with American troops on its ground, its sense of an existential crisis requiring full resistance would only be reinforced.
This means that the possible benefits of ground combat operations are outweighed by the costs.
Nevertheless, Trump should not just give up and declare victory. That would grant Iran a massive propaganda victory and only encourage its future aggression. Witnessing Iran successfully cow the U.S. simply by closing an energy chokepoint, China and other U.S. adversaries would take a lesson on how to fight the U.S. in future wars: with the exploitation of limited American pressure points. This fits very nicely with the Chinese military strategy in particular.
Trump’s unjustified declaration of victory would similarly see allies from the Middle East to Europe to Asia come to view Trump as utterly unreliable. As a leader willing to sacrifice their critical interests to escape his own temporary political difficulty. This would greatly undermine the U.S. alliance structure that has supported international peace and global prosperity (including much U.S. prosperity) since 1945. Allies would increasingly cut deals with American enemies in the belief that, regardless of what Trump said, America wouldn’t have their backs either at all or for long.
Trump’s angry suggestion this week that countries should send their own navies to reopen the Hormuz Strait without American support was profoundly counterproductive in this regard.
Yes, the Europeans and Sunni Arab monarchies should have sent their navies to assist in reopening the strait. Iran’s action is designed to cause economic harm to all nations, not just the U.S. and Israel. Still, these allies lack the military capacity to conduct such an operation alone. And were Trump simply to give up on opening the strait, U.S. allies would view increased cooperation with Iran as their only realistic option. This would boost rather than degrade the Iranian regime’s power.
Trump’s veiled strait surrender, presented as a victory, would also fuel Xi Jinping’s already Iran war empowered narrative in contrast to the U.S. This being that where America is dangerously unpredictable and unreliable, China offers economic and political reliability amid its otherwise loathsome espionage, intellectual property theft, human rights abuses, and territorial imperialism.
So, what should Trump do?
First, he should maintain the air campaign and stop broadcasting his public interest in a peace deal. This broadcasting reeks of desperation of a kind that only fuels the Guard to keep faith with its strategy of patient resistance. Second, Trump should instead make clear he recognizes that avoiding defeat is more important than immediate midterm election polls. This matters because the more damage Iranian leaders and institutions sustain, the more likely they are to buckle and favor diplomacy. The more damage Iranian forces cause around the Strait of Hormuz, the more likely it is that U.S. allies will send forces to help escort cargo ships.
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Third, Trump should restore sanctions on Iranian energy exports while making clear through intermediaries that he wants a meaningful peace agreement that Iran can swallow. That means a peace agreement that doesn’t demand the Iranian regime entirely relinquish its drones, missiles, and proxies, but rather agrees to verifiably end its nuclear threat.
This strategy might disabuse Iran of the notion that it can outlast the U.S., while simultaneously increasing its fear of economic implosion, fragmentation, and civil instability. In so, it might encourage Iran to enjoin serious diplomacy sooner rather than later.