Since President Donald Trump‘s first term, one of Europe‘s central objectives has been to demonstrate that it is willing to meet its spending commitments and shoulder greater responsibility for Europe’s continental security. To give credit where credit is due, Europe’s NATO members have now stepped up to the plate under immense dual pressure: both from Washington, in terms of pushing allies to increase defense spending, and from Russia, which remains the only real threat to the European continent.
Unfortunately, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte‘s recent statement that Europeans should “keep on dreaming” if they think Europe can defend itself without the United States risks undoing years of solid progress.
Almost all allies are now meeting their defense spending commitments of 2% of GDP on defense, reaffirmed at the Wales Summit in 2014, after years of inconsistent follow-through and delayed implementation. At the most recent NATO Summit in the Hague in June 2025, all allies agreed to an even more ambitious new target: reaching 5% of GDP by 2025, with 3.5% of that total comprising core defense requirements and 1.5% comprising other security-related needs, like infrastructure updates. The primary challenges remain fourfold: reaching the targets without using creative accounting that masks inefficient spending, translating that spending into the necessary capabilities to actually defend Europe, integrating planning between European countries to avoid vast sets of unnecessary duplication, and ensuring the U.S. remains committed to its alliance responsibilities.
The third issue—avoiding duplication—will always remain, no matter how integrated Europe’s defense industry becomes. In fact, some degree of built-in redundancy will always be necessary. But the deeper challenge lies in the fact that the EU was never designed to function as a security planner or provider. That leads to issue four, which is that the foundation for Europe’s continental defense will likely always fall within NATO’s purview. That means allies must ensure constituency among platforms and settle with some degree of dependence on the U.S. (which today, remains high) as the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security.
The problem with this overall picture is the tension between dueling schools of thought within NATO. Most allies are now committed to the idea that the U.S. isn’t in a European policy interregnum. Most understand the relationship with Europe will look fundamentally different going forward, even when Trump leaves office. In short, there’s no going back. Therefore, it is up to Europe to build its own pillar within NATO and place the ultimate responsibility of its continental security squarely on its own shoulders. This approach is popular with the Trump administration, and it will likely be popular with the next administration as well. A stronger Europe means a more capable ally, and more capable allies are good because they allow the U.S. greater geopolitical flexibility.
Unfortunately, there’s another camp that thinks that a stronger European pillar within NATO risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: That greater European defense capabilities will signal to Washington that it can do less in Europe, and that, in fact, that’s OK because Europe will be fine without it. That underlying fear creates a real aversion to discussions, let alone policy decisions, that will result in a more autonomous Europe.
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Rutte’s recent comments risk bolstering the argument of this second camp. Not only are his comments misguided, but there’s no reason a strong European pillar of NATO should remain a pipe dream. Nor should Europe rest on the assumption that it will always need the U.S. to defend it, or in the worst case, that the U.S. will always be there to do so. In fact, the Europeanization of NATO is exactly what the alliance needs to breathe new life into both its mission and meaning.
Rutte must put his full-throated support behind Europe building its own defense capabilities without the U.S. — the future of NATO could depend on it.