Religious security must evolve

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The year 2025 marked a grim milestone in the escalation of violence against religious institutions. While attacks on churches, synagogues, and mosques have surged, the security measures intended to protect them remain dangerously stagnant. Too many houses of worship exist as “soft targets” in an increasingly volatile world. By failing to address glaring vulnerabilities — specifically at entry points — and relying on outdated survival doctrines, we are leaving the faithful exposed.

The failure of ‘run, hide, fight’

For years, the FBI’s “Run, Hide, Fight” protocol has been the standard response to active shooters. However, this doctrine is fundamentally flawed when applied to houses of worship. It assumes a level of mobility and anonymity that rarely exists during a religious service. Furthermore, it subtly suggests that civilians can outrun or outmaneuver an assailant armed with a semiautomatic weapon.

History provides a tragic rebuttal to this doctrine. During the Tree of Life Synagogue massacre in Pittsburgh, there was no access control and no security presence. The shooter entered through an unmanned front door. For those inside, there was nowhere to run. Four people were killed in the sanctuary. Seven others sought refuge in a basement closet, only to be discovered and executed. When a building is a trap, “Run and Hide” is not a strategy — it is a death sentence.

The limits of volunteers and armed congregants

Many institutions rely on “eyes and ears” volunteers. While well-intentioned, unarmed guards are often the first victims. The 2015 murder of Dan Uzzan, a volunteer guarding the Great Synagogue in Copenhagen, serves as a haunting reminder that a vest and a radio cannot stop a bullet.

Similarly, while “concealed carry” congregants provide a last line of defense, they are often reactive. In the rare instances where a congregant stops a shooter, it almost always occurs after the killer has already entered the sanctuary and caused casualties. To truly protect a congregation, the objective must shift from reaction to interdiction.

Hardening the perimeter

The most effective security strategy is to keep the threat outside the building. A secure perimeter, beginning at the parking lot and ending at a hardened entrance, is essential.

  • Deterrence through presence: Uniformed, armed security outside the door acts as a psychological and physical barrier.
  • Access control: Entrances are “choke points” where people cluster, making them prime targets. Hardening these points with professional personnel prevents an intruder from ever reaching the “kill zone” of the sanctuary. Where appropriate, physical barriers can prevent car and truck ramming at entrances.
  • Countersurveillance: Attackers often use digital tools like Google Maps or physical “scouting” trips to identify gaps. A visible security presence disrupts this planning phase.

A modern hybrid threat

The threat landscape has evolved. We are no longer dealing solely with “lone wolves.” Today, political groups, terrorist organizations, and foreign actors provide digital intelligence and financial backing for domestic strikes. From the expulsion of Iranian diplomats in Australia for promoting antisemitic incidents to the global propaganda of ISIS and Hezbollah, religious sites are now targets of geopolitical significance. 

Even nonlethal intrusions, such as the anti-ICE protest at St. Paul Cities Church in Minneapolis that separated parents from children, highlight how easily a “welcoming” environment can be exploited to create chaos and fear. It also seems to be the case that outsiders heavily financed and organized the church invasion.

HARDEN THE CHURCHES

A house of worship should be a sanctuary of peace, but it cannot be a vacuum of security. An unprotected site does not invite participation. It breeds a pervasive fear that eventually hollows out the community.

Churches, synagogues, and mosques must bridge the gap with local law enforcement and the FBI to receive real-time threat briefings and professional training. We must move toward a “Defense-in-Depth” model that prioritizes the perimeter over the interior.

As Nehemiah the prophet observed in Chapter 4, Verse 9: “But we prayed to our God, and because of them we set up a guard against them day and night.” Faith is the reason for the gathering; security is what ensures the gathering can continue.

Stephen Bryen served as a senior defense department official and is the author of the new book, Security Planning for Holy Places (Amazon).

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