A de facto Chinese doughnut will soon sit right next to London’s financial center — “the doughnut” being the nickname of GCHQ’s doughnut-shaped headquarters (GCHQ is the United Kingdom’s signals intelligence service counterpart to the National Security Agency).
Last week, after all, Beijing finally received U.K. approval to build its so-called “super-embassy” at the former London site of the government coin manufacturer. The largest embassy in Europe, it will allow for some super spying. Why is the U.K. letting China get away with this?
It starts with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping. Xi wants to make China so powerful, economically and militarily, that all nations must abide by his diktats to remain at least somewhat prosperous and somewhat safe. Xi’s public offer to the world is that of “win-win cooperation.” Xi’s actual offer is Chinese dominance with a predictable face: ‘avoid challenging us internationally and we’ll throw you some scraps. Oh, and there will be no surprises.’ As part of that proposition, Xi was pushing hard for his new embassy to be approved.
President Donald Trump’s recent threats over Greenland and his derision for the sacrifices of allies made it easier for Prime Minister Keir Starmer to give Xi what he wanted. “Trump and Xi might both be bullies and might both have immense economic power,” Starmer and other leaders are increasingly thinking, “but at least Xi is a predictable bully.” Starmer timed his approval decision to take advantage of the British public’s distraction over Trump’s antics and to gift Xi before he heads to China on Wednesday. Still, there’s no question that this embassy will pose major security challenges.
Hence why Starmer had the heads of GCHQ and the U.K.’s MI5 domestic intelligence service (somewhat equivalent to the FBI) write a public letter. The spy chiefs argued there that while “it is not realistic to expect to be able wholly to eliminate each and every potential risk,” “proportionate” mitigations had been introduced to address security concerns related to the embassy. The “consolidation” of seven diplomatic compounds to just one “should bring clear security advantages,” they added.
This rhetoric is doing a lot of legwork. Starmer and his spy chiefs know that China’s espionage threat is vast in ambition, capability, and scale. But Starmer has repeatedly chosen to make security sacrifices to woo Xi toward increased investment, pressing spy chiefs to do the same. The U.K. would never have approved a Russian Embassy of this scale. But Russia doesn’t have China’s economic power. That power is buying China some special intelligence opportunities.
For one, the new embassy will sit next to underground fiber optics cables carrying financial and other data/communications. While the U.K. says safeguards will prevent tampering with these cables, Chinese intelligence services have shown themselves to be adept at circumventing security measures. And as the U.K. knows from its own experience, cable tapping is an ever-evolving art form.
China will similarly be able to use the embassy’s vast rooftop to emplace signal-intercept systems to capture information transmitted across the electromagnetic spectrum. It will be able to use the embassy’s vast interior, including underground facilities, to power this scaled intelligence collection. Chinese targets will include microwave transmissions and infrared laser beams used by financial traders. China may be able to manipulate the market with this data. China may also engage in screen-capture and keyboard logging efforts targeting offices near the embassy compound. China will also attempt to access low encryption communications data from Londoners working or walking nearby, and even from passengers on aircraft flying overhead. London City Airport is very close to the new embassy, and flights into London’s Heathrow Airport regularly orbit above it waiting for landing permission.
The Chinese intelligence modus operandi is to target whatever can be targeted and then triage that information for immediate, delayed use, or eventual deletion. Moreover, the U.K.’s public assurances that China has defrayed concerns it may establish an underground intelligence command and storage center are beyond absurd. China will build out that center and then claim it is simply researching high-energy renewable energy projects pursuant to win-win cooperation, etc. Beijing will gamble that the U.K. will then keep quiet about its suspicions, fearing an economically damaging diplomatic standoff.
There’s more. The embassy will come with a comprehensive network of facial recognition cameras. China will use these to try to mitigate MI5 surveillance efforts and for pattern of life analysis of those who commute in the embassy’s proximity. If any of these individuals are targets of interest for Chinese intelligence services — high-ranking bankers, lawyers, civil servants, businesspersons, politicians, etc. — this analysis will serve future recruitment efforts.
TOM ROGAN: CHINA MILITARY PURGE INCREASES MEDIUM-TERM TAIWAN THREAT
True, the consolidation of seven compounds into one will allow MI5 to monitor who comes in and out of the new embassy more efficiently. This will also allow MI5 to more intensely resource its surveillance teams at this one location than it could do at each of the other former seven compounds. Of course, the primary threat posed by the Ministry of State Security intelligence behemoth is not that of spies under diplomatic cover, but rather its legions of spies hiding as students, scientists, businesspersons, or activists.
Put simply, there is absolutely no question that this embassy is going to pose the U.K. serious security challenges. Starmer is making a dangerous gamble.