Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have long been regarded as strategic partners in the Middle East. As founding and leading members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the two states share deep economic ties, cultural affinities, and overlapping security interests.
This coordination has been evident during pivotal regional moments, from the 1973 oil embargo to the U.S.-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, and more recently during the 2017 blockade of Qatar. In each case, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi acted in concert to shape regional outcomes and protect shared interests.
Yet, deepening divergences over regional interests and how to achieve them have set the two countries on a collision course, one that may hinder the region writ large and complicate U.S. foreign policy thinking.
In Yemen and Sudan, two countries marred by devastating internal conflicts, competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has become increasingly visible. In December 2025, tensions hit an all-time high when Saudi forces struck the port city of Mukalla, where UAE shipments were believed to be transiting, forcing Emirati forces to withdraw from southern Yemen to avoid further escalations.
Once part of the same coalition to contain Houthi forces after ousting the Yemeni central government in 2015, today the two countries are on opposing sides of the war. While Saudi Arabia prioritizes the preservation of a unified Yemeni state under a central government aligned with Riyadh, the UAE has backed southern actors, most notably the Southern Transitional Council, who favor autonomy or outright secession. This divergence reflects fundamentally different threat perceptions: Saudi Arabia views fragmentation as a long-term security risk along its southern border, whereas the UAE has treated decentralized control as a means of securing maritime access and countering Islamist influence.
Tensions between Saudi-backed forces and STC-aligned militias have periodically flared, underscoring the limits of Gulf unity even within the GCC.
The stakes in southern Yemen are particularly high. Control over ports such as Mukalla and access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait directly affect global trade flows, with roughly one-third of world commerce passing through the Red Sea corridor. For both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, influence in this region intersects with broader ambitions to transform themselves into post-oil economic hubs focused on logistics, tourism, finance, and technology.
However, prolonged friction between the two Gulf powers risks undermining these ambitions. Even limited confrontations or proxy competition threaten to inject uncertainty into a region that both governments have spent years marketing as stable and investment-friendly. For international investors, perceptions of intra-Gulf rivalry raise questions about predictability, coordination, and long-term risk.
For the United States, this evolving dynamic presents a challenge. Washington has increasingly relied on both Saudi Arabia and the UAE as cornerstone partners in the Middle East, often prioritizing relations with them over traditional allies such as Egypt. A more fragmented Gulf landscape complicates U.S. efforts to pursue coherent regional strategies on security, trade, and energy.
Ultimately, the Saudi-UAE relationship is not collapsing, but it is no longer defined by automatic alignment. As both states pursue ambitious national transformations, managing rivalry without tipping into destabilizing competition will be critical, not only for the Gulf but for the broader regional order.
Alissa Pavia is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.