If you take his comments at face value, President Donald Trump’s objectives in Venezuela seem clear enough: dictator President Nicolas Maduro needs to pack up his things and get out of Caracas before it’s too late. Trump reportedly reiterated that demand during last week’s phone call with Maduro, even as he rejected the Venezuelan dictator’s demands for international immunity in exchange for handing over the reins of power.
But even if Trump’s goal is obvious, and I’m not sure any of us can say it is with any degree of confidence, another question springs to the surface: what is the motivation for Trump’s decision-making? In other words, why is Trump so desperate for Maduro to go? Is it because Maduro is a tyrant who stole last year’s presidential election? Because he’s the alleged head of a narcotrafficking organization referred to as ‘Cartel de los Soles?’ Because Maduro has turned Venezuela into a supposed outpost for the Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and Cubans in the Western Hemisphere?
I’ve been trying over the last two months to figure out what’s driving Trump’s stance toward Venezuela. None of the explanations provided by the administration is especially convincing to me.
It’s unlikely that Trump’s campaign is about returning democracy to Venezuela. Secretary of State Marco Rubio frequently brings up the fact that Maduro is an illegitimate leader, isn’t recognized by the United States as Venezuela’s official head of state, and blatantly stole the 2024 Venezuelan election after getting trounced by opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez. All of this is indisputably true. But even so, Trump isn’t a guy who cares about which country practices democracy and which country doesn’t. In fact, one can make the case that Trump gets along with autocrats more than politicians who are card-carrying democrats who cherish free elections. Whether it’s Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Trump finds dealing with these strongmen far easier than dealing with politicos who are accountable to their constituents and who have to maintain difficult domestic political coalitions. Indeed, Trump probably wouldn’t mind if a right-wing autocrat in the mold of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele took over from Maduro.
The drug issue is undeniably the central plank of the Trump administration’s public case against Maduro. This case is not entirely unsubstantiated; in 2020, Maduro was indicted by the U.S. Justice Department for narcotics trafficking. There’s no dispute that Maduro’s regime has colluded with Colombian drug cartels for years, either by looking the other way as cocaine is transiting Venezuelan territory or by organizing shipments.
But if countering drugs is what the Trump administration is after, then there are other countries in Latin America whose role in the trade is greater than Venezuela’s. Despite the White House’s contention that Maduro is the mastermind of a grand narcotrafficking conspiracy, Venezuela is in reality a medium-sized fish in a big pond. The 2025 State Department counternarcotics report finds that roughly 10% to 13% of the world’s cocaine is trafficked through Venezuela every year, not an insignificant sum but hardly the center of the cocaine universe. The figures presented by the Drug Enforcement Administration are even lower: 8% of the cocaine transiting the Caribbean Corridor toward the United States in 2019 used Venezuela as a jumping-off point. The rest started from Colombia and Ecuador. And as far as fentanyl is concerned, it’s Mexico, not Venezuela, that is the major country of concern.
Domestic politics could be a reason for Trump’s current policy, but it’s not like the American people are chomping at the bit for a regime change operation in America’s own hemisphere. In fact, Americans don’t seem to believe Maduro’s Venezuela is much of a danger. A CBS News poll found that only 13% of Americans considered Venezuela a major threat to U.S. security — 48% said it was a minor threat, while 39% believed it posed no threat at all. 70% opposed U.S. military action in Venezuela, and the MAGA base is divided on the issue. Unlike George H.W. Bush’s 1989 foray into Panama, which gained some political advantages by removing the “wimp” label from his shoulders, the political benefits of a similar action in Venezuela are slim.
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The only explanation one can come up with, then, is that Trump is still stewing from his failed attempt to push Maduro out during his first term, an effort that included handing over diplomatic recognition to the Venezuelan political opposition, supporting a small coup against Maduro’s inner circle, and embarking on a stringent maximum pressure policy to squeeze Venezuela’s oil industry. None of it worked. But Trump now has a second bite of the apple and is bringing more force to accomplish an objective he couldn’t have five years earlier. Much like Saddam Hussein was unfinished business for George W. Bush, Nicolas Maduro may be unfinished business for Donald Trump.
Is this really a good enough basis to launch a regime-change war, particularly after Trump spent the presidential campaign railing against toppling foreign governments? Hardly. But it at least gives some insight into the factors pulling him in this direction.